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Russian Federation: Executive Branch  
By Susan Cavan 
 
Succession stress: division of authority and assets 
President Putin and President-elect Medvedev thus far have accomplished a 
major breakthrough in Russian politics by setting a precedent in presidential 
succession.  Putin's decision to obey the constitutional limits of his presidency 
coupled with Medvedev's victory in elections (however "managed" and flawed), 
has provided a foundation for all future leaders – gone is the debate over 
changing the constitution, the early resignation, the "premature" demise, or the 
cloistering of regents; however imperfect the Putin-Medvedev diarchy, the 
decisions they have made will reverberate, possibly even in a positive direction, 
for Russia's next generations of leaders. 
 
While the exact distribution of powers between Putin and Medvedev has not 
been resolved, and likely will not be demarcated thoroughly until the two clash 
over policy or personnel at some future point, the outlines of each one’s sphere 
are becoming more clear.  Both eschew the idea of amending the constitution, 
but fortunately, the text of the constitution does provide a broad prerogative to 
the prime minister in the organization of the government; an authority Putin may 
choose to exercise in May, assuming that he is named Prime Minister 
(Government Chairman) following Medvedev's inauguration.  According to the 
constitution, "Not later than a week after appointment [the Chairman of the 
Government of the Russian Federation] shall submit to the President…proposals 
on the structure of the federal bodies of executive power." (1) 
 
It seems likely that policy formulation and implementation will follow structure, 
which will be determined by priorities in policy.  For now, Medvedev responds to 
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questions about how his power "tandem" with Putin will operate by drawing vivid 
yet programmatically vague distinctions between the role of the presidency and 
government: 
 
"It is the president who sets out the main directions of domestic and foreign 
policy.  He's the commander in chief, he makes key decisions on forming the 
executive.  He's the guarantor of rights and freedoms of Russian citizens.  The 
government has its own very extensive area of competence. … The 
government's job is complex, large, and challenging.  And it's quite obvious that it 
has enough of its own business to attend to.  In other words, it's all simple.  
Russia is a presidential republic with a strong executive authority. (… )Each 
branch of power must deal with its own set of affairs.  The president is guarantor 
of the constitution. … The government deals with its respective business.  This is 
perfectly normal." (2) 
 
While much is left unsaid in Medvedev's description of the division of authority, 
what is clear is an evolving view of the presidency as a non-executive branch of 
the Russian governing system.  While only time (and the inevitable use of power 
in practice) will tell, Medvedev seems to make a case for the presidency as 
formulating guidelines and goals for the government to implement. 
 
Medvedev also outlined the priority goals for his presidency (in an interview in the 
foreign media) and placed a significant emphasis on the need to overcome 
Russia's "legal nihilism," a theme he mentioned during the campaign, as well.   
Medvedev describes himself as "a lawyer down to my bones" and set the sights 
of his presidency on asserting the "supremacy of the law" in Russia. (3)   
Medvedev pointed to the positive foundation of Russian traditions stemming from 
"the continental Romano-Germanic law family," but quickly noted that all layers of 
Russian society, from the state, executive, bureaucratic, and even the individual 
willing to hand over (let alone demand) a bribe need to understand "the necessity 
and desirability of observing the law." (4) 
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Of course, the need for reform of, and eventually, respect for the judiciary also 
plays a significant role in Medvedev's presidential plan.  There is a familiar ring to 
Medvedev's focus on respect for the rule of law; it hearkens back to Putin's 
cruder, but thematically similar plan for a "dictatorship of laws."  In fairness, 
Putin's administration took a stab at legal and judicial reforms as envisioned by 
Dmitri Kozak, but there was little follow through on implementation, and Kozak 
was soon dispatched out of Moscow to quell unrest in the south of Russia.  
 
Kozak is said to be close to the incoming president, and perhaps he will be 
prevailed upon, once again, to undertake an evaluation and produce a reform 
plan that will instill respect for the law and the courts, to replace the "legal 
nihilism" Medvedev currently finds rampant in Russian society. 
 
Is transition last chance for current apparatchiki graft? 
The question of who is close to Medvedev—who will have influence and office in 
the next administration—occupies much analysis of the transition period.  There 
does seem to be a clique of individuals who recognize that the time to have their 
"snouts in the trough" of government service is coming to an end. (4)  Some 
among these individuals may be so shameless that their activities potentially 
threaten the stability of the succession and transition that Putin and Medvedev 
have endeavored to attain. 
 
It appears that there is a great deal of discontent among members of the Armed 
Forces, Ministry of Defense and General Staff over the actions of the current 
defense minister.  In late February, after a clash with Defense Minister 
Serdyukov, allegedly over his fire sale of DefMin property to associates in St. 
Petersburg, Colonel General Viktor Vlasov reportedly took his own life.  (5)  
Vlasov, who was the acting Chief of the Troop Housing (Billeting) Service of the 
Defense Ministry (and apparently was due to be promoted to Chief of the 
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division) reportedly left a suicide note that some sources claim complains of 
Serdyukov's "privatization policies." (6) 
 
According to reports, either the Russian Prosecutor's Office or the Military 
Prosecutor's Office are investigating the possibility that Vlasov, who is said to 
have had a "hard-hitting talk" with Serdyukov the night before taking his own life, 
was driven to the suicide. (7)  
 
The sources for the numerous stories regarding Vlasov include officers from the 
Billeting Service and some of those involved in the investigations into Vlasov's 
death.  According to some reports, Vlasov would not accede to Serdyukov's 
attempts to divide military assets and sell off those deemed unnecessary to the 
Defense Ministry and was soon to be replaced by a Serdyukov ally.  As 
Lieutenant-General Yuri Netkachev, a consultant with the Association for the 
Social Protection of Special Services Veterans explained, "It is by no means 
certain that Serdyukov and his team will remain at the helm after the presidential 
election.  That's why the tastiest morsels of property in Moscow and St. 
Petersburg are being broken off for privatization already." (8) 
 
The circumstances surrounding the death of General Vlasov garnered greater 
scrutiny recently when it was reported that Chief of the General Staff Yuri 
Baluyevsky, who has had repeated clashes with Defense Minister Serdyukov, 
once again submitted his resignation.   According to reports, Vlasov's suicide 
"was the last straw" for Baluyevsky.  (9) Along with General Baluyevsky, several 
other members of the Armed Services are said to have resigned or to be 
considering taking the step.  The Defense Ministry has denied reports of 
Baluyevsky's resignation, and at least one report suggests that the conflict 
between the Defense Minister and the Chief of the General Staff centers on the 
lack of progress in military reform, despite increased funding, during 
Baluyevsky's tenure. (10) 
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Clearly, the resignations of several high-ranking military officers would focus 
unwelcome attention on possible corruption among government officials, and 
some deal may be in the works to avoid that eventuality.  However, Medvedev 
may find it necessary, out of respect for the law, to make an example of 
government officials or apparatchiki quite early in his presidency.  Fortunately for 
Medvedev, there are numerous corruption investigation committees already 
working on this very problem. 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) Russian Constitution (in English), Article 114 via 
http://www.constitution.ru/en/10003000-07.htm. 
(2) "FT Interview: Dmitry Medvedev," 25 Mar 08, edited transcript,  www.ft.com 
via David Johnson's Russia List (JRL), 25 Mar 08, 2008-#62. 
(3) Ibid. 
(4) Reference to a Medvedev comment on stealing from the state. "Interview with 
Itogi Magazine," 18 Feb 08; www.medvedev2008.ru via Johnson's Russia List 
(JRL), 27 Feb 08, 2008-#42. 
(5) "General Vlasov's Tragedy," 22 Feb 08, Vremya novostey, pp. 1,3; Defense 
and Security (Russia) via Lexis-Nexis Academic; "Army Housing Chief takes his 
own life," by David Nowak, The Moscow Times, 22 Feb 08 via Lexis-Nexis 
Academic; "General in charge of army housing shoots himself," by Sergey 
Mashkin, Kommersant, No. 30, p.1, 26 Feb 08; RusData Dialine via Lexis-Nexis 
Academic; "Signaling a purge at the Defense Ministry, by Vladimir Mukhin, 
Nezavisimaya gazeta, No. 38, 27 Feb 08; What the Papers Say (WPS) via Lexis-
Nexis Academic. 
(6) "Signaling a purge at the Defense Ministry," Ibid. 
(7) "General in charge of army housing shoots himself," Ibid.; "Army housing 
chief takes his own life," Ibid. 
(8) "Signaling a purge at the Defense Ministry," Ibid. 
(9) "General Staff moving into opposition," Nezavisimaya gazeta, 24 Mar 08, pp. 
1,3; Defense and Security (Russia) via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
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(10)  "Generals annoyed with Their Minister," 27 Mar 08, Kommersant via 
http://www.kommersant.com/page.asp?id=871794, accessed 27 Mar 08. ;  
"Russia: Top Brass Signals Trouble within Defense Ministry," by Chloe Arnold, 
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), 27 Mar 08 via 
www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2008/03/5939761a-adea-493d-ba24-
d9d5b4ef6fe7.html, accessed 27 Mar 08. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Rose Monacelli 
 
Freedom of speech: a short-lived phenomenon?  
In spite of promises of free speech and open communication in Russia, the past 
eight years have brought unprecedented government command of the national 
message as state-controlled corporations and Kremlin-friendly individuals have 
purchased most of the country’s national television stations and major 
newspapers.  As a result, reporters and the media outlets for which they work 
have been hindered by both outside regulation and the looming threat of Kremlin 
retribution, forcing Russians who seek unfiltered news to find other sources.  By 
far, the most popular of these alternate news outlets is the Internet, whose 
relative anonymity allows for unfettered freedom of speech. There are currently 
more than 35 million Russians with access to the Internet, with 20 million users 
active daily.  This figure is higher than the audience of all of the country’s print 
media outlets combined. (1) The Internet has introduced another phenomenon, 
weblogs, or “blogs,” into the Russian consciousness.  There has been a recent 
explosion of blogging, which allows citizens to comment freely and publicly on 
current events and express dissenting opinions.  There are about 3.5 million 
blogs currently registered to Russian Internet users, a figure 2.6 times larger than 
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it was last year.  Every day, approximately 210,000 entries are added to existing 
blogs and 7,000 new ones are started. (2)  
 
As a result, stories that traditionally are ignored by the established media are 
being made public.  In one recent example, the students and faculty of St. 
Petersburg’s European University took their protest to the Internet when the 
government shut down the campus after the school accepted European Union 
funding to research improvements in election monitoring. (3) Although national 
television channels refused to report the story, students used web sites and 
blogs to spread information and coordinate protest activities.  Unfortunately, this 
and other online success stories have given rise to equally pervasive counter-
efforts as the government has moved to prevent the Internet from becoming a 
political liability.  Since January, three official proposals have been made by 
various regulatory bodies aiming to bring the Internet under state control.  The 
first, Parliament’s “On the Internet,” attempts to create a legal framework for 
regulating online content.  In February, the Federal Council, the Justice Ministry, 
the Interior Ministry, and the Public Chamber introduced legislation designed to 
control the Internet as part of a proposal to amend media laws to include all web 
sites with a daily audience of at least 1,000, including blogs, forums, and chats. 
(4) Under the law, site owners would be required to register through the state 
agency responsible for overseeing mass media. In addition, sites would have to 
cite their sources, which would also have to be registered publications. (5) The 
law would be part of a larger Mass Media Act that would impose similar 
restrictions on all forms of media that reach at least 1,000 people. (6) According 
to its supporters, the act is ostensibly an attempt to regulate the destructive 
information found on the Internet, including child pornography, terrorist 
propaganda, and extremist, xenophobic and slanderous information. (7) 
However, it would also allow for unprecedented control over not only the material 
available online, but the individuals who create it. 
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Another piece of legislation, introduced in the State Duma, would restrict foreign 
ownership of Internet service providers (ISPs) by setting limits on foreign 
investment in telecommunications and Internet companies.  It also would force 
ISPs to allow authorities to read members’ e-mails. (8) Last week, the chief of the 
special technical operations department of the Interior Ministry went so far as to 
suggest registering the passport information of citizens before they are able to go 
online.  This measure is the first of its kind, even in China, the country that 
currently has the strictest regulations on Internet use in the world. (9) In the past 
week, the Prosecutor-General’s Office filed corresponding proposals to both 
Russian houses of Parliament, the State Duma, the Federation Council, and the 
President asking for Internet providers to be held legally responsible for 
objectionable and extremist materials found online.  Another proposal demanded 
a legal definition of unacceptable material “in terms of public morality, public 
safety … and anti-extremist legislation.” (10) The same proposal demanded that 
responsibility for such content be placed on those who control the domain where 
the site is registered, acknowledging that it’s technically impossible to determine 
the author of online material.  
 
Past instances of Russian authorities attempting to charge private citizens for 
material posted on the Internet have centered around nationalistic propaganda.  
However, none of them ever made it to court. (11) A case currently underway 
has raised concerns for bloggers who are routinely critical of authority. Savva 
Terentyev, a local musician in the Komi Republic town of Syktyvkar wrote last 
year on his blog that police officers “have the mentality of a repressive club in the 
hands of the powers that be,” and that “the infidel cops [should be] burnt.” (12) In 
the first prosecuted case of its kind, Terentyev is being charged with inciting 
hatred by belittling a social group.  If convicted, he faces up to two years in prison 
for a violation of article 282 of the Russian Criminal Code. (13) This is the first 
case in Russia involving commentary in an online diary, with prosecutors 
claiming that Terentyev’s blog is a form of mass media and arguing that he was 
using his diary “with the goal of publicly urging citizens to fight against the given 
 9 
social group.” (14)  The government’s charges raise several questions that are 
currently being debated in and out of court, namely whether or not an Internet 
diary can be considered a form of mass media and whether the police are a 
social group or a profession.  Anton Nosik, director of livejournal.com’s Russian 
division, recently told reporters that the case against Terentyev was baseless.  
He blamed “the ignorance of local judges,” which “often plays a role in the 
outcome of cases connected to the Internet” and expressed his hope “that with 
many journalists present, the judge will look at the essence of the case and not 
simply hand down a guilty verdict.” (15) 
 
Given that the Terentyev case has drawn international attention to the fact that 
Russian authorities have begun to tighten control over the Internet, it may set a 
precedent for online freedom of speech.  However, without a solid definition in 
place of what “inciting hatred” actually entails, it may prove to be a more 
complicated issue than the prosecution originally thought.  In order to prove that 
Terentyev’s aggressive language was meant to incite violence, linguistic experts 
have been hired in order to review the language used in the blog entry. (16) 
 
For now, it is widely understood that none of the proposed laws are likely to pass.  
First, there is no existing legal precedent for lawmakers to define offensive 
Internet content. Beyond that, binding regulatory measures on Internet content 
are rendered impossible with today’s technology because Internet content can be 
moved quickly from site to site.  Even if some form of these measures succeeds, 
it remains to be seen how widespread the effects will be, as several factors 
currently limit the influence of the Internet: personal computers remain a luxury 
item; the number of citizens with access to the Internet is still limited; and 
Russia’s technological infrastructure is antiquated, resulting in slow Internet 
connections and a lack of service in rural and poor areas. (17) 
 
Despite these issues, the current wave of regulatory proposals has critics 
drawing comparisons to Soviet-era censorship. (18) This may be premature and 
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a bit extreme, but it should be noted that shortly after Nosik spoke out in favor of 
Terentyev, livejournal.com was bought by Kremlin-friendly businessmen in a 
move that inspired comparisons to the gradual Kremlin takeover of Russia’s 
broadcast and print media. (19) Given that 75 percent of the blogs in Russia can 
be found within five sites: livejournal.com, LiveInternet.ru, Diary.ru, 
Blogs@Mail.ru and LovePlanet.ru, (20) the ease with which livejournal.com was 
taken over should not be ignored by observers. 
 
It remains to be seen how the government’s policy concerning Internet content 
will shift during the next administration.  During the recent Presidential campaign, 
President-elect Medvedev put a positive spin on the Russian Internet boom, 
commenting that “we live in an absolutely transparent information society” and 
expressing his view that an independent media source like the Internet will give 
citizens more access to information, which should help to fight corruption. (21) 
He also has expressed his disapproval of the Duma’s plan to restrict foreign 
investment in Internet technology. (22)   
 
If all else fails, other measures are already in place to deter the next generation 
from becoming as media savvy as the current one.  Russia’s InfoCentre online 
recently posted guidelines for parents hoping to protect their children from 
websites containing pornography, animosity, the glorification of terrorism or 
ethnic hatred that students currently have access to, since Russian state 
educational programs provide Internet connections to every Russian school.  
Further, warns the InfoCentre, “Internet communication may cause depression.” 
(23) 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) “Russian prosecutors ask Parliament to regulate Internet content,” The Other 
Russia, 18 Mar 08 via http://www.theotherrussia.org/2008/03/18/russian-
prosecutors-ask-parliament-to-regulate-internet-content/. Last accessed 20 Mar 
08. 
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(2) The Associated Press, “Freewheeling, vibrant, critical – blogging becomes 
antidote to Russia’s neutered media,” The International Herald Tribune, 20 Mar 
08 via http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/02/20/europe/EU-POL-Russia-
Blogging-Election.php. Last accessed 20 Mar 08. 
(3) Kim Zigfeld, “Russia vs. Bloggers,” PajamasMedia, 20 Mar 08 via 
http://pajamasmedia.com/2008/03/russias_crackdown_on_bloggers.php. Last 
accessed 20 Mar 08. 
(4) Lyudmila Alexandrova, “Proposed attempts to censor Russian Internet 
unrealistic – experts,” Itar-Tass, 12 Feb 2008 via http://www.itar-
tass.com/eng/level2.html?NewsID=12364048&PageNum=0.  Last accessed 12 
Mar 08. 
(5) “Russian Parliament moves to regulate Internet sites,” The Other Russia, 14 
Feb 08 via http://www.theotherrussia.org/2008/02/14/russian-parliament-moves-
to-regulate-internet-sites/. 
Last accessed 12 Mar 08. 
(6) “Counters for Russia’s Internet,” Kommersant, 12 Feb 08 via 
http://www.kommersant.com/page.asp?id=851856. Last accessed 12 Mar 08. 
(7) Ibid. 
(8) Ibid. 
(9) Ibid.  
(10) “Medvedev saves internet providers from deputies,” Cnews, 17 Mar 08 via 
http://eng.cnews.ru/news/top/indexEn.shtml?2008/03/17/292434. Last accessed 
20 Mar 08. 
(11) “Blog Case Goes to Court,” Kommersant, 13 Mar 08 via 
http://www.kommersant.com/p866185/freedom_of_speech/.  Last accessed 20 
Mar 08. 
(12) Ibid. 
(13) Mike Eckel, “Blogger charged in Russia,” The Associated Press, 12 Mar 08 
via 
http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5i0cPorjgYBuvyyEhq7SR3JWi7cqgD8VC3AP
00. Last accessed 20 Mar 08. 
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(14) “Russian blogger faces prison,” The Independent Online, 12 Mar 08 via 
http://www.int.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=1&click_id=24&art_id=nw20080312114
521761C949773. Last accessed 20 Mar 08. 
(15) Ibid.  
(16) Ibid. 
(17) “Russian blogger heads to court after fiery comment,” The Other Russia, 13 
Mar 08 via http://www.theotherrussia.org/2008/03/13/russian-blogger-heads-to-
court-after-fiery-comment/. Last accessed 20 Mar 08. 
(18) Ibid. 
(19) “Russian Parliament moves to regulate Internet sites,” The Other Russia, 14 
Feb 08 via http://www.theotherrussia.org/2008/02/14/russian-parliament-moves-
to-regulate-internet-sites/. Last accessed 20 Mar 08. 
(20) Ibid. 
(21) The Associated Press, “Russia’s Medvedev says Internet serves as a 
guarantee of media independence,” ITAR-TASS, 15 Feb 08 via Johnson’s 
Russia List. Last accessed 12 Mar 08. 
(22) Ibid. 
(23) “Protect your children from the Internet,” Russia InfoCentre, 19 Mar 08 via 
http://www.russia-ic.com/news/show/5983/. Last accessed 20 Mar 08. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Fabian Adami 
 
Togliatti bomb “Not Terrorism” 
On 31 October 2007, a bomb exploded on a bus in Togliatti. Eight persons were 
killed and 50 wounded. Within a very short period of time, investigators had 
announced that the explosion was equivalent to 2 KG of TNT, while the press 
claimed that evidence of a suicide bomb had been discovered at the scene. 
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The FSB’s investigation into the incident apparently lasted less than two days 
and was a “model” of police work. Early in November, FSB Director Patrushev 
announced that the FSB had “established” who was responsible for the bombing. 
As was to be expected, investigators claimed that the bombing was linked to 
Dokka Umarov, a Chechen warlord, and insisted that intelligence provided 
evidence of his culpability and ties to the bombing. 
 
The speed of the investigation itself was suspicious. At the time of the bombing, 
the presidential elections were less than four months away, and Russian 
authorities were determined to show that the administration was “tough on 
terror,” in order to ensure that Dmitri Medvedev, President Vladimir Putin’s hand-
picked successor, obtained victory in the polls. (1) 
 
Despite Patrushev’s then definitive announcement on 2 November, it seems that 
the FSB’s investigation into the Togliatti bomb has, in fact been, ongoing. On 11 
March 2008, Yuri Rozhin, Chief of the FSB Directorate in the Samara region, 
announced that the bombing was not, in fact, an act of terrorism. Rather, the 
explosion was the result of the “careless handling” of an “improvised explosive 
device” by a Togliatti resident, Yevgeni Vakhrushev. (2)  
 
Vakhrushev apparently had become fascinated by explosive devices after 
watching a Discovery Channel program on the manufacture of bombs. 
Vakhrushev then found “instructions on the internet” and built his own device. (3) 
The FSB searched Vakhrushev’s residence and discovered materiel “identical” to 
the substance found at the blast site. (4) The investigation into Vakhrushev, 21, 
showed that he was “quite reserved,” (read loner) and that he had twice tested 
self-made devices in local forests. (5) Together with the inquiries made by the 
FSB, a psychiatric profile revealed that Vakhrushev “suffered” a “certain illness,” 
(6) which likely caused his actions. 
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The Togliatti case constitutes a classic example of why FSB statements on 
“terrorism” must be viewed with suspicion. The initial “investigation” clearly was 
tainted, and was carried out and concluded with a national-political goal in mind. 
Now that the elections are over, the FSB apparently sees no contradiction in 
announcing that a lone, mentally disturbed person was responsible, rather than 
the Chechen hydra blamed in November. 
 
“Assassination” attempt prevented?  
 Ten days after the 2 March Presidential polls, FSB Chief Nikolai Patrushev 
announced that the election period had seen several major successes for the 
agency. Addressing a meeting of the National Anti-Terrorist Committee, 
Patrushev claimed that the FSB had foiled a number of terrorist attacks – 
specifically including sabotage, planned for polling day. (7) Several days after 
Patrushev’s comments to the NAC it emerged that these “terrorist” acts 
apparently included an assassination attempt. 
 
A story that initially appeared in the newspaper Tvoy Den’, but was picked up by 
other outlets, claimed that a Tajik national was arrested in Moscow on the day of 
the election.  The individual, Shakhvelad Osmanov, had rented an apartment 
overlooking one of the approaches to Red Square. His alleged intention was to 
shoot President Vladimir Putin and his successor, Dmitri Medvedev, as they 
walked through the historic square to attend a concert. (8) Hours before the 
“presidents” appeared publicly, an FSB special unit (possibly drawn from the 
Alpha Group) (9) stormed the apartment, arrested the “supposed killer,” and 
seized a number of weapons, including a sniper rifle and a Kalashnikov. (10) 
Reports of the incident indicate that the FSB was able to act on the basis of an 
anonymous tip several days before the election and that the rifle was of foreign 
manufacture. (11) 
 
At the time of writing, there are contradictory reports on the incident. The FSB 
apparently has refused to confirm or deny the story, although Interfax has 
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claimed that an “unnamed secret service official” had denied the story. (12) The 
Tajik embassy in Moscow meanwhile, claimed that it had “established” on the 
embassy’s “appeal to the relevant official structures of Russia,” that Osmanov 
was a “Russian citizen,” born in the Akhtynskiy District of Dagestan. (13) 
 
Obviously, the idea of a terrorist act—specifically an assassination attempt—
cannot be dismissed out of hand. It may be that the FSB is refusing to comment 
officially because steps are being taken to investigate a plot, and to verify its 
origin. It is also possible, that the “plot” is a fake tabloid story, or a false flag 
operation by the Security Services designed to provide justification for further 
operations in Dagestan and/or Chechnya and Ingushetia.  At the time of writing, it 
is not possible to state definitively which is the case—whether and how the 
incident develops remains to be seen. 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) See The ISCIP Analyst, Volume XIV, Number 5 (15 Nov 07). 
(2) “Russian FSB Says Last Year’s Lethal Bus Blast in Volga City Not Act of 
Terrorism,” RIA Novosti News Agency, Moscow, in Russian, 11 Mar 08; BBC 
Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis.  
(3) “Togliatti Bus Blast in Oct 2007 Was Not Terrorist Attack,” Agentstvo 
voyennykh novostey,” 12 Mar 08; OSC Transcribed Text via World News 
Connection.  
(4) Ibid. 
(5) “Careless Handling Of Bomb Behind Togliatti Bus Blast—FSB,” ITAR-TASS, 
Moscow, in English, 11 Mar 08; OSC Transcribed Text via World News 
Connection. 
(6) Ibid.  
(7) “Terrorist Acts At Presidential Election Prevented,” Agentstvo voyennykh 
novostey, 12 Mar 08; OSC Transcribed Text via World News Connection.  
(8) “Russian Tabloid Alleged Putin, Medvedev Assassination Attempt,” Ekho 
Moskvy Radio, Moscow, in Russian, 15 Mar 08; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis.  
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(9) Ibid. 
(10) “Sniper’s Arrest Foils ‘Plot To Kill Putin,’” The Sunday Telegraph, 16 Mar 08 
via Lexis-Nexis.  
(11) Ibid.  
(12) Ibid. 
(13) “Embassy Denies Tajik Involvement in Putin Assassination Plot,” Avesta 
website, Dushanbe, in Russian, 18 Mar 08; BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit via 
Lexis-Nexis. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Lt. Col. Carol Northrup 
 
A toe in the door in Uzbekistan? 
Nearly two and a half years after being forced to evacuate the air base at Karshi-
Khanabad (K-2), US military personnel again have been granted limited access 
to military facilities in Uzbekistan.  During a 5 March press conference in 
Moscow, NATO Caucasus and Central Asia Envoy Robert Simmons announced 
that Tashkent has agreed to allow US military personnel to use facilities at 
Termez Air Base (in southern Uzbekistan) on a “case by case” basis. (1)  
Negotiations apparently began when US Central Command Commander William 
Fallon met with Uzbek president Islom Karimov in January.  After some initial 
confusion as to the actual terms of the agreement (early reports indicated that 
the United States military had been granted renewed access to K-2), NATO and 
US officials have emphasized that though US military personnel have been 
granted permission to transit through the country, there are no plans to re-
establish a US military presence in Uzbekistan. (2)  The Uzbek government 
adamantly denies any change in policy regarding US military activity on Uzbek 
territory, calling any such claims “wishful thinking” by NATO.  (3) 
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Uzbekistan’s poor human rights record long has made relations with the US 
difficult.  However, immediately following the 11 September terrorist attacks, 
Washington and Tashkent reached an agreement allowing US military forces to 
use Uzbek air space and the “necessary military and civilian infrastructure” at 
Karshi-Khanabad. (4)  The location of K-2—it is about 90 miles from the Uzbek-
Afghan border—made it an ideal place from which to stage the heavy passenger 
and cargo flow required to support military operations in the Afghan theater.  K-2 
also served as a staging base for soldiers from the 10th Mountain Division, who 
conducted search and rescue operations, and other ground units conducting 
combat raids into Afghanistan.  In return, the US bolstered security along 
Uzbekistan’s border with Afghanistan and agreed to “consult on an urgent basis” 
about any security or territorial threat to Uzbekistan. (5) 
 
The arrangement worked until May 2005 when troops from the Uzbek Interior 
Ministry and National Security Service troops fired into a crowd of unarmed 
demonstrators in the city of Andijan, killing hundreds in what several human 
rights organizations labeled a massacre.  US condemnation of the events and 
demands for an international investigation led Tashkent to announce in July 2005 
that it was abrogating its agreement permitting the US military use of K-2.  The 
Pentagon was given six months to withdraw all its forces and cease all military 
activities there. (6)  Washington completed withdrawal in November and US 
military personnel have been banned from Uzbekistan ever since. 
 
Though the US military has been banished, Tashkent has allowed NATO forces 
to continue operating out of Uzbekistan.  A German Bundeswehr aviation unit 
has been operating an air bridge from Termez  to Afghanistan since 2002 as part 
of NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). (7)  Under the terms 
of the new agreement, only individual Americans “attached to the NATO 
international staff” are able to use the air bridge from Termez as a transit point for 
troops and supplies, and only on a “case by case basis.” (8)  No US personnel 
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will be billeted in Uzbekistan and no US aircraft will operate out of Termez or 
Karshi-Khanabad. 
 
While the West’s reaction to the Andijan incident appears to have pushed 
Uzbekistan closer to Russia and China, Uzbekistan appears intent on pursuing a 
multi-directional foreign policy.  (9)  Moscow, Beijing and Washington all desire 
influence in Central Asia and Tashkent understands the value of appeasing all 
three.  As a member of regional organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO), the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CTSO) and the 
Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC), Uzbekistan works closely with Moscow 
and Beijing.  However, Uzbekistan has had to deal with terrorist attacks and 
turmoil from the Taliban and other extremists operating from Afghanistan for 
more than 20 years, and has a strong interest in cooperating with the West in the 
Global War on Terror (GWOT).  As beneficial as the K-2 agreement was for the 
United States, it also was very beneficial for Uzbekistan, which still wants very 
much to strengthen security and end the fighting along its Afghan border.   
 
The Termez agreement is a far cry from the full access US forces enjoyed at K-2, 
but it is a good sign that relations with Uzbekistan may be thawing – a fact that is 
not viewed with enthusiasm in Russia.  Many in Russia claim that the recent 
“rapprochement” has little to do with the Global War on Terror and a good deal to 
do with the US desire to gain a foothold in Central Asia. (10)  This claim is not 
entirely unfounded.  Uzbekistan’s geographically strategic location and natural 
resources have made it attractive to Russia, China and the US for years (in fact, 
Moscow is currently negotiating with Tashkent to gain use of K-2 and other 
Uzbek military facilities for the Russian Air Force). (11)  All three nations have 
been vying for influence in Central Asia for years, and US interest in Uzbek 
airspace and facilities almost certainly extends beyond the GWOT.  
 
The West has gained more than improved military cooperation.  In addition to his 
comments about US use of Termez, Simmons highlighted the improved human 
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rights dialogue with Uzbekistan: “Recently, given certain events, including access 
of the European Union to discussion about human rights in Uzbekistan, relations 
between Uzbekistan and NATO have improved.” (12)  Uzbek authorities also 
recently have given amnesty to several prominent rights activists. (13)  These are 
small steps and it is highly unlikely that either Uzbekistan’s internal repression or 
its foreign policy vis-à-vis US basing will change drastically any time soon.  This 
slight thaw, however, is indicative of the progress that can be made when 
Washington tones down the rhetoric and emphasizes areas of shared interest 
and mutual cooperation. 
 
Source Notes:  
(1) “Uzbekistan Lets US use its Territory for Afghanistan Operation,” ITAR-TASS, 
6 Mar 08 via World News Connection. 
(2) “USA has no Air Base or Troops in Uzbekistan—Official,” BBC Monitoring 
(AKI press News Agency website), 19 Mar 08 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(3) “Uzbek Official Says Reports on Allowing USA to Use Base “Wishful 
Thinking,” BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit (ITAR-TASS), 7 Mar 08 via Lexis-
Nexis. 
(4) “US, Uzbekistan Make Deal,” Associated Press Online, 13 Oct 01 via Lexis-
Nexis. 
(5) Ibid. 
(6) “Tashkent Quietly Allows US to Return to Uzbekistan,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, 
10 Mar 08 via http://www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2372869.  
(7) Ibid. 
(8) “Uzbekistan Lets US use its Territory for Afghanistan Operation,” ITAR-TASS, 
6 Mar 08 via World News Connection. 
(9) “No Grounds to Say Uzbekistan Making  U-Turn in Favour of USA—Russian 
Expert,” BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union (Ferghana.ru News Agency 
website), 15 Mar 08 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(10) Ibid. 
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(11) “Russia Seeks Use of Uzbekistan’s Khanabad Air Base,”Nezavisimaya 
gazeta, 12 Mar 08 via World News Connection. 
(12) “NATO:  Uzbekistan allows US, Other Members to Use Air Base to Supply 
Afghanistan,” Associated Press Worldstream, 5 Mar 08 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(13) Ibid. 
 
The thoughts and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and 
do not necessarily reflect the official position of the United States Air Force, 
Department of Defense, or the United States government. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Fabian Adami 
 
ABM & NATO talks 
Last week, Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice and Secretary of Defense Robert 
Gates traveled to Moscow. The main purpose of the visit was to hold talks with 
key Russian officials, including President Putin, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, 
and President Putin’s “Crown Prince,” Dmitri Medvedev on the issue of the 
proposed US Anti-Ballistic Missile Shield. Secondarily, the purpose of the talks 
was to “smooth” relations between Moscow and the United States ahead of the 
forthcoming NATO summit, to which Russia has been invited. (1) 
 
Before Rice and Gates departed for Moscow, President George W. Bush 
apparently sought to prepare the ground by sending a letter to his Russian 
counterpart. According to a statement made by President Putin, the letter was “a 
serious document,” which would be carefully examined. (2) Although neither side 
officially commented on the missive, Interfax reported that it raised the issue of 
the “legacy both Presidents are leaving behind.” (3) 
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Although Rice and Gates met both with Putin and Medvedev, the meat of the 
discussions consisted of “2+2” sessions with Lavrov and Defense Minister Anatoli 
Serdyukov. The Russian position remains that the planned US missile shield, 
with bases and radar sites in Poland and the Czech Republic, is a clear strategic 
threat to its own security, particularly because the radars could peek into Russia 
and interfere with the country’s air defenses. (4) 
 
While the United States does not need Russia’s approval to build the ABM 
system, the Rice-Gates delegation presented its counterparts with a set of 
proposals designed to allow Russia ways to monitor the “operations of a radar 
station,” and to assess “the condition of an interceptor missile base to be 
deployed in the Czech Republic and Poland.” Foreign Minister Lavrov described 
these proposals as “confidence building measures,” allowing Russia to “be sure 
that this system does not work against us.” (5) Lavrov argued that what matters 
in arms talks is not “intentions…but potential” and noted that the US had “finally” 
recognized that Russian “concerns are not groundless.” (6) Russia, according to 
Lavrov, would be allowed to carry out the aforementioned monitoring by “human” 
as well as “technical means.” (7) At the time of writing, Lavrov's comments 
provide the only clues of what the US offered. It is not clear specifically what was 
contained in the US proposals. 
 
It is highly unlikely that Russia will agree to the ABM shield, in spite of efforts to 
persuade the Kremlin that it is not aimed against Russia, but at Iran and North 
Korea. Nor is the Kremlin likely to accept the argument that the shield is not 
designed—or able—to stop a massive nuclear strike, such as Russia would seek 
to launch in the highly unlikely event of nuclear war. The ABM shield is not able 
to prevent a first-strike.  Russian intransigence stems from an overall strategic 
viewpoint, whereby the United States is still seen as the main adversary. As 
such, US bases, weapons or “emplacements” on the soil of former Warsaw Pact 
and new NATO member states (still viewed by Moscow as being its “sphere of 
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influence”) are viewed as a major obstacle to the aims of the Rodina, and the 
idea of simple "verification" of US capabilities is unlikely to satisfy the Kremlin. 
 
US “intrusion” into Russia’s “Near Abroad” was a second issue of discussion 
between the delegations in Moscow. The idea of Georgian and Ukrainian entry 
into NATO is a major concern to Moscow. During the Rice-Gates visit, Lavrov 
told the press that NATO expansion is reminiscent of the “assimilation of blocs” 
of the Cold-War, which was a “game with zero result,” serving only to destroy 
“stability instead of building it up.” (8) Georgian and/or Ukrainian accession to 
NATO, according to Lavrov, would have a seriously “destructive impact” on US-
Russian relations. (9) It seems that Russia’s position on further NATO expansion 
is as intransigent as its stance on ABM defense. 
 
Despite disagreements on ABM and NATO, an accord called the “Strategic 
Framework Document” is to be signed between the US and Russia. This 
document, while not a treaty, will address all areas of bilateral cooperation 
including agreed-upon issues such as anti-terrorism, as well as laying out areas 
that need further discussion. (10) 
 
The creation of this accord hardly can be described as a success. Neither the US 
nor Russian leaders seem poised to change their minds on questions that both 
view as central to their own national security. It is possible that both sides are 
playing a waiting game: Russia, à la Khrushchev in 1960, may be hoping that a 
new administration will change its position on NATO expansion and ABM 
Defense. The US, meanwhile, may hope that President Medvedev will be more 
amenable to its positions. If this is the case, both sides likely will be disappointed: 
the rhetoric emanating from all three Presidential campaigns in the US has not 
been pro-Russian, while Lavrov used a visit to Paris on 11 March to state firmly 
that there would be “continuity” in Russian foreign policy, even after Medvedev’s 
accession. More of the same would seem to be the order of business.  
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Russian Federation: Energy Politics 
By Creelea Henderson 
 
Central Asian producers hike gas prices 
On March 12, Russian Business Daily Kommersant reported that Central Asian 
national energy executives—KazMunayGaz President Uzakbay Karabalin from 
Kazakhstan, Uzbekneftegaz Board Chairman Nurmukhammad Akhmedov from 
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Uzbekistan and Turkmengaz CEO Yagshigeldy Kakaev from Turkmenistan—had 
reached a joint decision to raise the price of Central Asian gas volumes to 
European levels in 2009. (1) Because no pricing formula has been worked out 
yet, Kommersant was unable to provide exact figures, though it was estimated 
that the national gas companies would hike their prices from current levels of 
$130 to $250 per thousand cubic meters (tcm) to $250 or $270 per tcm in 2009. 
 
Two facts in the story—the where and the when—bear closer examination. The 
decision to raise the price of gas next year was announced at Gazprom 
headquarters in Moscow, where the company’s chief, Aleksei Miller, had 
convened the meeting to press for an increase in coordination among the 
region’s national gas sectors. (2) From the timing of the announcement, 
observers were able to infer much about its eventual consequences: The 
statement of intent to raise the price of Central Asian gas preceded, by a day, the 
start of another round of negotiations between Gazprom and a delegation from 
Ukraine’s national energy company, Naftohaz, to resolve the question of 
Ukrainian gas supplies for 2008. Talks between the two sides have been 
deadlocked for more than a month over a disputed gas bill running over $1 billion 
that Gazprom delivered to the Ukrainian government in February. [For 
background, see: ISCIP “Behind the Breaking News,” 3 Mar 08] (3) This round 
was aimed at finding an acceptable intermediary to replace RosUkrEnergo and 
UkrGazEnergo, while holding the price for Ukraine’s gas steady at $179.50 per 
tcm. 
 
Ukraine’s Prime Minister, Yulia Tymoshenko, is adamantly opposed to the 
continued presence of intermediaries in the delivery of gas supplies to Ukraine. 
She has accused RosUkrEnergo, a company in which Gazprom holds a 50 
percent share, of stealing gas volumes piped into Ukraine, then turning around 
and selling them in lucrative European markets downstream. (4) Tymoshenko 
has expressed the willingness of her government to deal with Gazprom directly, 
on bilateral terms: “I believe Russia will be conciliatory towards Ukraine and form 
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relations with no go-betweens...I always believed there should be no 
intermediaries, no short-lived corporations. We have Gazprom and Naftohaz. 
Let's sign an agreement and buy gas.” (5) Gazprom, perhaps reluctant to give up 
the leverage provided by its stake in RosUkrEnergo, has been unwilling to 
consider the elimination of intermediaries responsible for the distribution of 
Russian and Central Asian gas volumes in Ukraine, and has threatened to hike 
the price of its gas to $321 per tcm if the intermediaries are removed from the 
supply chain. (6) With the announcement that Central Asian gas producers, from 
whom Ukraine receives the great majority of its gas supply, will be raising their 
prices to match Russian levels next year, comes an abrupt contraction in 
Ukraine’s room for maneuver vis-à-vis Gazprom. 
 
Gazprom’s partnership in the decision to raise the price of Central Asian gas 
exports is one of several signs of growing cooperation in the region’s energy 
sphere. Earlier this month, Russian officials agreed to hand over Soviet-era 
geological and geophysical data showing Turkmen natural gas reserves of 10 to 
14 trillion cubic meters—making the country home to the world’s fourth largest 
reserves—to the government of Turkmenistan’s President Gurbanguly 
Berdymukhamedov. (7) No doubt the data will prove useful to the Turkmen 
government in its efforts to boost the country’s hydrocarbon output in the near 
future. Moscow proffered the information as a goodwill gesture aimed at retaining 
Berdymukhamedov’s loyalty to its campaign for dominance in the Central Asian 
energy export scheme. The scheme revolves around a Kremlin-backed plan, laid 
out in May 2007, to expand the Prikaspiisky pipeline network that carries natural 
gas westward along the Caspian shoreline from Turkmenistan. If and when the 
Prikaspiisky pipeline network is fully developed, it will likely put an end to 
Western-backed plans for a trans-Caspian pipeline carrying Central Asian gas to 
Western Europe, and assure Russian primacy over the region’s gas export 
routes. 
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Kazakhstan already has thrown its support behind Russian export schemes. Last 
year Kazakhstani President Nursultan Nazarbaev signed on as a partner in the 
Russian-Turkmenistan-backed Prikaspiisky pipeline agreement, and this spring 
he reiterated his loyalty to Moscow by turning Ukrainian President Viktor 
Yushchenko away empty-handed from bilateral talks held in Astana, where the 
Ukrainian side hoped to garner support for its plans to expand the Odessa-Brody 
pipeline network that would transport Caspian oil (including Kazakh crude) 
through Ukraine to Poland, bypassing Russia. Nazarbaev made it clear that 
Russia, in control of oil transportation, held the key to any decision. "The 
question of the Odessa-Brody project remains open. We have to agree with 
Russian oil transportation organizations to supply the necessary volumes to 
Ukraine," Nazarbaev told a news conference. (8) 
 
Certainly, three Central Asian countries—Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and 
Turkmenistan—will benefit from increased revenues due to next year’s price 
hike. Although Gazprom was party to the talks leading up to the announcement 
of a new pricing structure for Central Asian gas, analysts doubt that prices were 
raised at Moscow’s initiative. Russian daily Vremya novostey suggested that a 
consolidated Central Asian front is underway that will result in an OPEC-like 
consortium of gas producers that Western observers have long feared from 
Russia. (9) ISCIP fellow and Central Asia expert Monika Shepherd has 
reservations about Central Asian commitments to long-term coordination over 
gas prices (or anything else), though she views the price increase as a sign that 
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan recognize that they have 
considerably more clout in the energy game and are prepared to take advantage 
of it. 
 
For its part, Gazprom comes out a loser in the short term, as Russia, too, will be 
forced to contend with higher energy costs, but in the long term the company has 
scored a major strategic victory as a result of the price hike. The increase in gas 
prices likely will sound a death knell for the trans-Caspian Nabucco pipeline 
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proposed by Western powers to bring Turkmen gas to Europe and leave 
Gazprom the undisputed hegemon over export routes downstream. 
 
Ukraine is doubtlessly the biggest loser in the new pricing scheme for Central 
Asian gas. Without relatively cheap Turkmen volumes to offset the higher cost of 
Russian gas, Ukraine has nowhere left to turn for affordable energy. This puts 
Ukrainian negotiators at a real disadvantage in the ongoing talks with Gazprom 
and may make them more inclined to accept Russian demands for intermediaries 
to oversee the delivery of Ukraine’s gas supplies. In order to buffer the effects of 
the price hike the Ukrainian government may be spurred to reevaluate and 
considerably stiffen its transit tariff regime for Russian energy transports across 
Ukrainian territory. 
 
As noted above, Gazprom loses from the price hike because the company will 
have to pay more for imported gas volumes intended for domestic consumption 
and re-export. However, the company has indicated that it will deal with the new 
price regime by simply passing costs downstream to consumers in Europe. 
 
Source Notes: 
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Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan,” Gazprom corporate website, 11 Mar 
08 via (http://www.gazprom.com/eng/news/2008/03/27365.shtml). 
(3) Lynch, Tammy. “Shades of 2006: Russia squeezes Ukraine over gas again,” 
Behind the Breaking News: A briefing from the Institute for the Study of Conflict, 
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(http://www.bu.edu/phpbin/news-cms/news/?dept=732&id=48867). 
(4) Ibid. 
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Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Robyn Angley 
 
ARMENIA 
State of emergency lifted but tensions remain  
The state of emergency imposed following the lethal dispersal of opposition 
protests on 1 March has been lifted but the underlying issues remain. The 
protestors did not necessarily rally in favor of opposition candidate and former 
president Levon Ter-Petrosian. Prime Minister Serzh Sarkisian is not the only 
candidate ever to have rigged an election and Ter-Petrosian, with his poor record 
in the early post-Soviet years, was at best the lesser of two evils. As in so many 
former Soviet republics, the rallies were not so much in favor of one issue as they 
were against another. The rallies expressed discontent with Robert Kocharian’s 
regime and his way of doing things, as symbolized by Kocharian’s designated 
successor, Sarkisian. Kocharian’s regime is perceived as representing corruption 
and a widely anticipated attempt to rig the elections. This time, however, with 
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Ter-Petrosian in the running, there was hope that things could actually change. 
Despite the government’s crack-down and determination to move things along, 
the underlying dissatisfaction with the lack of democratic process persists. 
Sarkisian’s attempt to build a government of national unity may founder as a 
result of that dissatisfaction. 
 
GEORGIA 
NATO aspirations and the Kosovo effect 
With the April summit in Bucharest fast approaching, Georgian leaders are 
pushing hard for Georgia to be offered a Membership Action Plan (MAP). The 
referendum conducted during the presidential elections in January showed that a 
sizable majority of the population shares the government’s NATO ambitions. 
 
However, Georgia’s acceptance into NATO has never been a given. Many of the 
obstacles to its potential membership are linked to Russia. Georgia and Ukraine, 
which is also seeking a MAP, would be the first former Soviet republics other 
than the Baltics to join the alliance. Russia strongly opposes Georgia’s bid, 
claiming to fear the possible establishment of NATO bases on its southwestern 
border. In addition, Georgian NATO membership would confirm further the loss 
of Russia’s former sphere of influence in Tbilisi. 
 
No examination of Georgia’s potential NATO candidacy can afford to overlook 
the Kosovo factor. Russia staunchly opposed Kosovo’s independence, ostensibly 
out of solidarity with the Serbs as Moscow’s Slavic brethren. On the other hand, 
Russian officials have not hesitated to point out that Kosovo sets a precedent for 
other separatist areas, including the Georgian breakaway republics of Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia, which depends upon Russia’s support. Most recently, the 
Russian government lifted formal economic sanctions against Abkhazia, while 
the Duma passed yet another resolution urging the recognition of Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia. 
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Though Russia undeniably has tried to block Georgia’s entrance into NATO both 
through diplomacy and interference in the separatist republics, Russia’s 
opposition is not the only obstacle. The strong-armed suppression of protests in 
November by Saakashvili’s government has served as a reminder of how fragile 
Tbilisi’s stability is. Although receiving a MAP would be a signal achievement for 
Mikheil Saakashvili, he is unlikely to attain it in April. The recognition of Kosovo in 
February was already a thorny issue with Russia; NATO’s older European 
members are unlikely to antagonize Russia further by extending MAPs to 
aspirants with internal difficulties. However, NATO members could use the 
possibility of receiving a MAP next year as a way of pushing for resolution of 
separatist issues in Georgia. 
 
Opposition hunger strike called off  
The eight-party opposition bloc, whose tents have been a constant presence on 
the steps of parliament for the last 17 days, has called off its hunger strike 
following a request from Georgia's patriarch, Ilia II. Opposition leaders have cited 
the patriarch's intervention as the primary reason for ending the strike. (1) The 
decision followed an initially unsuccessful attempt by the patriarch to end the 
hunger strike on 21 March. 
 
The decision to call off the hunger strike comes just days after parliament passed 
a contentious new amendment to the election code. Passed by a vote of 134 to 
2, the amendment changes the election process for members of parliament. 
Under the new legislation, 75 of the 150 parliamentarians will be elected in first-
past-the-post elections in single-mandate districts. The remaining 75 members 
will be elected by proportional representation of party lists. (2) The new law also 
includes a provision stating that the candidate with the most votes in a single-
mandate district wins automatically without a runoff if he/she has earned more 
than 30 percent of the vote. (3) 
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The passage of the law represents a significant blow to the opposition, for whom 
a central demand has been a more drastic change of the electoral law. (4)  Other 
issues have included the composition of the board of trustees for Georgian Public 
Broadcasting (GPB), which is currently in the process of replacing its director 
general, and numerous points of contention regarding Imedi TV. Imedi was 
owned by the late Badri Patarkatsishvili, Georgian oligarch and presidential 
hopeful in the January elections. The channel was a mouthpiece for the 
opposition leading up to the November protests and was closed by the 
government during the state of emergency. It has remained a subject of 
controversy in the ensuing months. Following Patarkatsishvili's death in 
February, a man named Joseph Kakalashvili claimed to have purchased Imedi. 
(5)  
 
The opposition protests thus far have netted very few gains. The GPB board is 
changing, per negotiations with Speaker of Parliament Nino Burdjanadze in 
January. However, although opposition and government officials have engaged 
in sporadic negotiations ever since the presidential election in January, the 
opposition has yet to achieve any major victories. The hunger strike has received 
considerable media coverage, but has failed to influence the government thus 
far. It seems that the opposition would be better served to direct its efforts toward 
winning seats in parliament rather than camping out in front of Burdjanadze’s 
office. 
 
Source Notes: 
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Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Monika Shepherd 
 
Tajikistan seeks foreign investment in hydropower, but snubs Russia 
In the wake of Tajikistan’s recent energy crisis, which brought the country’s 
economy to a virtual standstill for a number of weeks, President Emomali 
Rahmon has been soliciting foreign investment proposals and offering to 
increase bilateral trade opportunities with several countries.  In fact, during his 
recent trip to the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) meeting in Dakar, 
foreign investment and trade seemed to be the issues uppermost on the Tajik 
president’s mind, as he held meetings with Iran’s President Mahmud 
Ahmadinejad, (1) Qatar’s Amir Shaykh Hamad Bin-Khalifah Al Thani, (2) as well 
as with top-level Syrian and Bahraini officials.  Rahmon’s discussions with both 
the Bahraini foreign minister (3) and Qatar’s head of state focused heavily on 
procuring Arab investment in Tajikistan’s hydropower industry, raising the 
possibility of including Qatar in the consortium charged with completing 
construction of the Roghun hydroelectric power station. (4)  On the eve of his 
departure for the OIC meeting, Rahmon also held talks with Algerian Prime 
Minister Abdelaziz Belkhadem, during which the two discussed Algeria’s 
participation in the development not only of Tajikistan’s hydroelectric power, but 
also of its coal deposits and highway infrastructure. (5)  Notably absent from the 
array of foreign officials with whom the Tajik president has been negotiating 
investment opportunities are any representatives from the Russian Federation. 
 
Over the last several years, Russian companies seeking to exploit Tajikistan’s 
hydropower resources have not fared well, drawing the ire of Emomali Rahmon 
himself.  Russian companies were involved in the construction of two sorely 
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needed new hydroelectric power stations, the Sangtuda-1 and Roghun projects.  
At present, Tajikistan’s hydroelectric power facilities have the capacity to produce 
a maximum of only 16.5 billion kilowatt hours annually, although it is estimated 
that at normal water levels, the country’s rivers have the potential to produce 300 
billion kilowatt hours per year.  Construction and planning of the two new 
hydroelectric power plants began years ago, but experienced repeated delays 
due to security concerns, financing, and technical issues. (6)  Russia’s Unified 
Energy Systems (UES) financed the building of the Sangtuda-1 power station, 
but construction fell behind schedule and the station was not able to go on-line 
until January of this year, which no doubt cost the Tajik government dearly.  The 
country’s principal consumer of electricity is also its largest source of domestic 
revenue, the Tajikistan Aluminum Plant (TadAP).  The government regularly 
subjects its citizens to electricity rationing in order to feed the needs of the 
aluminum plant, but this winter’s energy crisis became so severe that even 
TadAP’s needs could not be fully met and production fell. (7) 
 
The Roghun project has been underway since Soviet times, but stalled after the 
Soviet Union’s collapse and the outbreak of the Tajik civil war (the war lasted 
from 1992-1997).  When project development resumed in 2004, Russian 
Aluminum (RUSAL) agreed to build the Roghun power station (which, when 
completed, will have the capacity to generate 13 billion kilowatt-hours of 
electricity), as well as a second aluminum smelter, in return for the right to 
operate TadAP.  TadAP is slated to become the principal recipient of the Roghun 
plant’s power, thereby freeing up Sangtuda-1’s output for use by the rest of the 
country.  But, when RUSAL was slow to live up to its investment commitments 
and disagreements ensued with the Tajik government over the height and type of 
dam to be built, President Rahmon lost patience and cancelled the deal 
altogether, last fall.  UES then declared its willingness to undertake the project, 
(8) but Rahmon has decided to create an international consortium to finance 
Roghun’s construction, instead. Thus far, Ukraine appears to be the only country 
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whose participation in the project has been confirmed, although Iran has 
expressed a definite interest in it, as well. (9) 
 
Iran already is financing the Sangtuda-2 hydropower project, due to come on-line 
in three years (10) and will undertake the construction of at least one more new 
hydroelectric power station, the Shurob facility, for which planning has been 
underway since last summer.  (11) During his 24 March visit to Dushanbe for a 
trilateral meeting with his Tajik and Afghani counterparts, Iranian foreign minister 
Manuchehr Mottaki reaffirmed his country’s commitments to Tajikistan, not only 
in the arena of hydropower, but also in the construction of power lines, railroad 
links, and roads to link all three countries. Afghanistan, which also was affected 
by the recent energy crisis, has turned to Tajikistan for additional electricity 
imports.  Even Iran plans to import Tajik electricity, once the Sangtuda-2 project 
is complete – construction of this facility includes a plan to link the two countries’ 
power grids with one another, in order to better regulate power supplies to each 
other’s low and high consumption areas. (12) 
 
Due to their geographic proximity and shared cultural and linguistic heritage, it is 
not surprising that the Tajik and Iranian governments would seek to collaborate in 
substantial investment projects.  As the past few months have demonstrated, 
Tajikistan’s industry and infrastructure are still woefully lacking and unable to 
meet even domestic consumption needs, and Iran appears to be a logical and 
very willing partner in the expansion of Tajik trade and investment opportunities, 
especially in the wake of President Rahmon’s recent disillusionment with Russian 
investors.  But, aside from the economic benefits to be gained, Iran has an 
additional motive for currying the Tajik government’s goodwill, namely its desire 
to attain full membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).  Iran 
currently has observer status in the SCO, but has applied for full membership 
and has received President Rahmon’s support in this endeavor. (13) Full 
membership in the SCO could provide Iran with greater access to the Central 
Asian trade and energy market, which, when combined with its efforts to gain 
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part of the Caspian energy market, could make Iran a much more influential 
player, not only in Central Asia (considered by some to be Russia’s backyard), 
but on the world stage, as China, Russia, the US and Western Europe vie for the 
world’s remaining petroleum resources.  Russia’s misplaying of its hand in 
Tajikistan may lead to a windfall for Iran. 
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